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Abstract 
Based on individual occupational choice in a model including a production function with public investment and public 
health infrastructure, this paper presents an examination of how allocation of public investment and public health 
infrastructure affects the dynamics of income. Individuals work as skilled laborers or unskilled laborers, as in the model 
described by Caselli (1999), and educational costs are necessary to work as a skilled laborer. Results show that 
government should provide both public investment and public health infrastructure to escape from the poverty trap with 
low income. Moreover, based on an initial allocation between public investment and public health infrastructure, it is 
decided how the government should form a policy to increase income growth. 
Keywords:Public investment, Health infrastructure, Life expectancy, Occupational choice, Economicgrowth 
1. Introduction 
As explained by Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) and UN-HABITAT (2011), African countries must be provided 
infrastructure (Transport, Modern Energy, Telecoms, Water System, Sanitation, andso on) to foster economic growth 
and to escape from poverty. Providing infrastructure can achieve the Millennium Development Goals. UN-HABITAT 
(2011) introduces to the macroeconomic empirical literature that the development of infrastructure brings about 
economic growth and productivity effects (Estache, Speciale and Veredas (2005), Ayogu (2007)). In developed 
countries, that infrastructure is sufficiently provided, but not in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan African 
countries.
1
Therefore, the government must carry out policies to increase the infrastructure. Governments in 
Sub-Saharan African countries for infrastructure spend, on average 6-12% of their gross domestic product(GDP) 
(UN-HABITAT (2011)). 
Referring to these data, we consider the manner in which the government should provide infrastructure. Some kinds of 
infrastructure exists. This paper presents examination of the allocation of the infrastructure of two types: one for public 
investment, which increases labor productivity (transport, telecoms, and so on) and the other for health infrastructure, 
which raises life expectancy (water system, sanitation, hospitals, and so on). 
Based on simple Overlapping Generations Model (OLG), we discuss occupational choice, either skilled or unskilled, in 
addition to public investment with life expectancy. Especially, we address not only public investment but also life 
expectancy against dynamics. Many papers describe studies of capital accumulation by government. Barro (1990), 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) examine public capital accumulation and 
growth. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) show public accumulation and growth with human capital investment. 
Turnovsky (1997) also discusses public capital accumulation and growth and the difference between a socially planned 
economy and a decentralized economy. Yakita (2008) discusses an endogenized fertility rate and an aging economy 
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1As shown by UN-HABITAT (2011), in Sub-Saharan African countries, paved roads are 11.9% of all roads (2006), access to 
electricity is available in only 18% of households (2004), water with improved water sources is accessible to only 58% of population 
(2006), and only 31% of the population has access to improved sanitation facilities (2006). 
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including public accumulation. Public investment in these earlier studies serves an important role in increasing 
productivity. 
Apart from public capital accumulation, many papers have described studies of educational choice. Maoz and Moav 
(2000) examine skill acquisition and inequality including intergenerational mobility. Caselli (1999) and Galor and Moav 
(2000) introduce an idea that people have to pay the cost and learn new skills to work with new technology. Chen (2010) 
uses an overlapping generations model with life expectancy and educational choice. 
Some studies have been conducted on the assumption that life expectancy is set exogenously, such as Chen (2010). 
However, some papers consider life expectancy as an endogenous variable. Chakraborty (2004) and Hashimoto and 
Tabata (2005) set the model that life expectancy depends on public expenditure for health infrastructure, such as 
hospitals, clean water supply, and so on. By virtue of public expenditure, income per capita increases because capital 
accumulation is stimulated.
2
 Chakraborty and Das (2005) and Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) use an economy model in 
which private health investmentcan raise life expectancy and income per capita because of an increase in the saving 
rate. 
In fact, we can consider two reasons that an economy might become enmired in a poverty trap with low income: low 
productivity and a low saving rate. If a government provides public infrastructure, then the productivity of labor and 
capital increases. Thereby, the model economy escapes from the poverty trap. However, an increase in public health 
infrastructure raises the saving rate and then labor productivity rises thanks to an increase in capital accumulation. 
Finally, the model economy escapes from the poverty trap. Our paper presents examination as the following process. 
First, based on Chen (2010), the paper presents public expenditure of two types (public investment and public health 
infrastructure) and examines what the government should provide to escape from the poverty trap. Second, after 
escaping from the poverty trap, the paper presents derivation of how the government allocates tax revenue between 
public investment and public health infrastructure to increase income growth. 
As derived in this paper, the allocation for public health infrastructure to escape from the poverty trap should be within 
a certain range. If this allocation is large, because of a decrease in public infrastructure and low productivity of labor, 
then the economy can not escape from the poverty trap. However, if the allocation for public investment is large, then 
capital accumulation is prevented and productivity of labor is low and the economy can not escape from the poverty 
trap. Moreover, based on the initial allocation, the government is expected to provide public infrastructure or public 
health infrastructure to raise the income growth rate. The results obtained in this study show how the government 
provides a policy tobring about income growth with a given tax revenue. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents a description of 
equilibrium and macroeconomic dynamics and derives the conditions under which income growth continues. Lastly, we 
summarize the salient points of the paper.  
2. The Model 
The model economy is based on a two-period (young and old) overlapping generations model. This economy has agents 
of three types: households, firms, and a government. 
2.1 Households 
Households experience two periods: young and old. During the young period, each household supplies labor inelasticity 
to earn labor income. This economy accommodates labor of two types: skilled laborand unskilled labor. Education costs 
must be incurred in order to become a skilled laborer, as assumed by Caselli (1999), Meckl and Zink (2004), Miyake, 
Muro, Nakamura, and Yasuoka (2009), and by Chen(2010). That cost is assumed as  . Herein, 
s
tw denotes the 
wagerate of skilled labor. The government imposes labor income taxation on the wage income of skilled labor to 
provide public investment andpublic health infrastructure.
3
Each household allocates its labor income between 
consumption in the young period and saving. Consequently, we obtain the following budget constraint: 
   

 s
t
t
s
ts
t w
R
c
c 1
1
12
1 , (1) 
                                                        
2
Hashimoto and Tabata (2005) derived the relation between health infrastructure and fertility. 
3This paper assumes that the government imposes income tax for skilled labor wage income in terms of redistribution. This paper 
assumes that the government can collect tax revenue from only skilled labor wage income because of the view of redistribution . 
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Indexes s and u respectively denote skilled labor and unskilled labor. Inaddition, tc1 and 12 tc respectively denote 
consumption in the young period and old period. utw denotes the wage rate of unskilledsector. 1tR signifies an interest 
rate for annuitized savings. signifieslabor income tax rate(0 < <1).Finally, t denotes the period. A household’s  
utility function ut is given as shown below. 
Therein, tp denotes the probability that the individual lives during the old period. These savings are allocated among 
older living people if the individual dies: this is annuitized wealth. The optimalallocationsat skilled labor are determined 
as 
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(5) 
If a worker is an unskilled laborer, then 
 
u
t
t
t w
p
c



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1
1
, 
(6) 
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(7) 
2.2 Firms 
This paper assumes the production function shown below.
4
 
. (8) 
Therein, 
 
denotes the aggregate output. 
 
and 
 
respectively denote public investment and capital stock. 
denotes the skilled labor amount. Assuming that the population size of each generation is unity, then the unskilled labor 
amount is shown as . With a perfectly competitive market, profit maximization reduces the following equations, 
as 
, (9) 
                                                        
4
Some papers consider a production function with public investment. For example, Barro (1990) assumed     1GLKY . In 
addition, Caselli (1999) assumed that not only labor but also capital stock is inputted as a productive factor in the unskilled sector. 
Neither Caselli (1999) nor Chen (2010) considered public investment. 
    BALBLGAKY ttttt 

0,0,10,1
1


tY tG tK tL
tL1
 
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


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t
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t
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GAw 11
  10,10,ln1ln 121   ttttt pcpcu  . (3) 
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. (10) 
The interest rate is shown as 
. (11) 
It is noteworthy that 
. (12) 
Capital stock is assumed to be fully depreciated in one period. 
2.3 Government 
The government imposes labor income taxation at a tax rate  on skilled labor to provide public investment 
tG  
and 
public health infrastructure 
tH . Public health infrastructure is regarded as hospitals, cleanwater systems, and so on to 
raise life expectancy. Then, the government budget constraint is presented as 
t
s
ttt LwHG  , (13) 
Our paper assumes the following allocation rule. 
t
s
tt LwG  . (14) 
  t
s
tt LwH  1 . (15) 
In those equations, 　
  10    denotes the ratio of public investment to tax revenue and 1  denotesthat of 
public health infrastructure. Moreover, this paper includes the assumption of life expectancy as 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝐶𝐻𝑡
𝜀 , 1]
 100  tpandC . 
3. Equilibrium 
This section presents derivation of the equilibrium of this model economy. If workers move freely between two sectors, 
then the indifference condition is described as 
w
B
wst ˆ
1






. (16) 
Considering (9), (14), and (16), tL is given as 
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(17) 
Intuitively, an increase in 
tK  raises tL  because an increase in 
s
tw brings about an increase in the amount of skilled 
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labor. Therefore, we assume that 
2
1
 .
5 
Additionally, we assume the total population size ineach generation as unity. 
Then, the dynamics of capital stock at 1tL is derived as shown below: 
 
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where 
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C . In contrast, an increase in tK  raises tL . 
Therefore, the dynamics of capital stock at 1stL  is derived as  
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where    


















1,11min
1111



  tt KACp , and     



 


1111
11 AX .
7
 Then, 
s
tw  and tr1  at 
1tL  are 
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Therefore, calculating   t
s
tttt LwKrY  1 , we obtain   tt KAY 
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(22) 
Then, we can depict the dynamics of 
tK  as presented below. 
 
                                                        
5 1  denote the elasticity of output Y  for public investment G , i.e., 
Y
G
dG
dY
. Our paper assumes small elasticity such as 
Barro(1990). Barro(1990) assumed 25.01   and simulated the model economy. 
6
Considering (17) and
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7See Appendix for the form of this dynamics equation. 
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Fig. 1. Dynamics of tK (Income growth). 
Assuming      1111
1111






  A , there exist dynamics of two types. The first is that income growth 
occurs for any 
0K (Fig.1). The second is that income growth occurs or does not occur for given 0K (Fig.2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Dynamics of Kt(Income growth or no income growth). 
In Fig.1 given an initial 
0K , income growth continues. Then, only skilled labor exists. However, in Fig.2, given 0K  
less than K
~
, the capital stock converges to *K , which exists for both unskilled labor and skilled labor. It is the poverty 
trap bringing about low income B. The condition not to have the poverty trap is  
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where   












1
1 B
Cpt
. Defining the right-hand-side of this inequality as  F , we obtain   
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F
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

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

d
dF  is 
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negative and the sign is positive if *  . Then the following figure is shown. 
 
Fig. 3. Range of βnot to stay in the poverty trap. 
The solid line is given by the following condition as 
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 













1
*
111
1
111
1
t
t
p
p
AB
B
 
(24) 
Where    











1
1 * B
Cpt
. Otherwise, the dashed line is given. At the solid line, if  exists between 0 and 1 , 
then the dynamics is shown in Fig.1 and the poverty trap does not exist. Therefore, even if the economy stays in the 
poverty trap shown by *K , the economy escape from the poverty trap and income growth continues as the government 
sets   within 10   . However, with the parametric condition to hold the dashed line, the economy can not 
escape from the poverty trap. Then, the following proposition is established. 
Proposition 1 If Eq. (24) holds, then the economy can escape from the poverty trap and incomegrowth continues to set 
 within 
10   . 
This proposition is intuitive. If   is small, then public health infrastructure is large but public investment is small. 
Small public investment decreases labor productivity and the income level. Then, the saving is small and capital 
accumulation is not large. Therefore, the economy can not escape from the poverty trap. However, if   is large, then 
public investment is large but public health infrastructureis small. Small public health infrastructure brings about short 
life expectancy and the saving rate is low. 
However, if the condition of (24) does not hold, then the government can not induce the economy to escape from the 
poverty trap with the allocation of  . The government must collect more tax revenueand allocate public investment 
and public health infrastructure. However, an increase in tax burden decreases capital accumulation because of a 
decrease of the saving. If the following condition 
   0
1
1
1
1
1







 

 





tp  (25) 
is held, then an increase   shift down the curve of )(F 8. Defining * to equalize (25), )( *F at *   is larger 
than one, then the economy can not escape from the poverty trap even if the government changes   and  . The 
following proposition is established. 
                                                        
8
We obtain this condition as 
  ( )
  
  . This condition shows that the effect to decrease capital accumulation by an increase in   
is small. 
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Proposition 2 If  *F  at *  is larger than one, then the economy always stays in the povertytrap even if the 
government changes  and  . 
 
Next, we consider that the economy escapes from the poverty trap and that income growth continuesand examine how 
the allocations of   affect income growth. Calculating 
 𝐾𝑡+1
  
 at (19) in 1tp , we obtain the following equation. 
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(26) 
If 01   , then the sign of 
 𝐾𝑡+1
  
 is positive. In 01   , if 
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(28) 
the sign of 
 𝐾𝑡+1
  
 is positive. Then the following proposition is established. 
Proposition 3 If income growth countries and 01   , then an increase in   can always raise the income growth 
rate. If 01    and the condition given by Eqs.(27) and (28) holds, then an increase in   can raise the income 
growth rate. 
An increase in   increases wage rate s
tw and the saving increase,too.However, an increase in   reduces public 
health infrastructure. This effect decreases capital accumulation. Moreover, an increase in   raises tax revenue 
because of an increase in public investment and reduces tax revenue because of adecrease in capital accumulation 
because of a decrease in life expectancy. If 01   , then the effect of an increase in   raises tax revenue 
dominates; then life expectancy raises. However, if 01   , then the effect of an increase in   decreases life 
expectancy predominantly. In this effect is large, then an increase in   reduces income growth. 
The income growth rate in this model economy converges to 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
= 𝑋 . We note that lim𝐾𝑡  
 
𝐾𝑡
=   and 
lim𝐾𝑡  𝑝𝑡 = 1. Then, an increase in   can always raise income growth because an increase in   does not affect 
life expectancy, which is a sufficiently large level. 
 
4. Concluding and Remarks 
This paper described a model with public investment and public health infrastructure and illustrated how an increase in 
public investment and public health infrastructure affect capital stock, the amountof skilled labor, and the wage rate. 
First, the government must adequately allocate public investmentand public health infrastructure to escape from the 
poverty trap. Public investment and an increasein life expectancy with public health infrastructure can stimulate capital 
accumulation. Therefore, the government sets these allocations not to be disturbed these both effects. Second, if the 
economy can escape from the poverty trap and income growth continues, then an increase in public investment cannot 
always raise income growth. However, if the allocation of tax revenue for public health infrastructure is large or capital 
accumulation is small, an increase in public investment can raise income growth. 
References 
Ayogu M. (2007). Infrastructure and Economic Development in Africa:A Review. Journal of African Economics, 
Supplement, 1, 75-126. 
Applied Economics and Finance                                                                 Vol. 3, No. 3; 2016 
101 
 
Barro, R. J. (1990). Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth. Journal ofPolitical Economy, 98, 
S103-S125. 
Barro, R. J., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992). Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth. Review ofEconomic Studies, 
59, 645-661. 
Bhattacharya, J., & Qiao X. (2007).Public and Private Expenditure on Health in a Growth Model. Journal of 
Economics Dynamics & Control, 31, 2519-2535. 
Caselli, F. (1999). Technological Revolutions. American Economic Review, 89(1), 78-102. 
Chakraborty, S. (2004). Endogenous Lifetime and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Theory, 116, 119-137. 
Chakraborty, S., & Das M. (2005). Mortality, Fertility, and Child Labor. Economics Letters, 86, 273-278. 
Chen H. (2010). Life Expectancy, Fertility, and Educational Investment. Journal of PopulationEconomics, 23, 37-56. 
Estache, A., Speciale, B., & Veredas, D. How Much Does Infrastructure Matter to Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa?.The 
World Bank. 
Foster, V., & Briceño-Garmendia, C. (2010). Africa's Infrastructure - a Time for Transformation. The World Bank. 
Futagami, K., Morita, Y., & Shibata, A. (1993). Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth Model with Public Capita. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 95, 607-625. 
Galor, O., & Moav, O. (2000). Ability Based Technological Transition, Wage Inequality and EconomicGrowth. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 469-497. 
Glomm, G.,&Ravikumar, B. (1997). Productive Government Expenditure and Long-Run Growth. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics & Control, 21, 183-204. 
Hashimoto, K., & Tabata, K. (2005). Health Infrastructure, Demographic Transition and Growth. Review of 
Development Economics, 9(4), 549-562. 
Maoz, Y. D., & Moav, O. (2000). Intergenerational Mobility and the Process of Development. Economic Journal, 109, 
677-697. 
Meckl, J.,& Zink, S. (2004). Solow and Heterogeneous Labor: A Neoclassical Explanation of Wage Inequality. 
Economic Journal, 114, 825-843. 
Miyake, A., Muro, K., Nakamura, T., & Yasuoka, M.(2009). Between- and Within-Group Wage Inequalities, and the 
Advent of New Technology. Journal of Economic Inequality, 7(4), 387-394. 
Turnovsky, S. J. (1997). Fiscal Policy in a Growing Economy with Public Capital. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1, 
615-639. 
UN-HABITAT (2011). Infrastructure for Economic Development and Poverty Reduction. UnitedNations Human 
Settlements Programme Nairobi 2011. 
Yakita, A. (2008). Aging and Public Capital Accumulation.International Tax and Public Finance, 15(5), 582-598. 
  
Applied Economics and Finance                                                                 Vol. 3, No. 3; 2016 
102 
 
Appendix  
 
Form of the dynamics equation 
 
The sign of 
 𝐾𝑡+1
 𝐾𝑡
 of (19) is positive. The sign of 
𝜕2𝐾𝑡+1
𝜕𝐾𝑡
2  is calculated as follows. 
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where    



  


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
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
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
tt KAH
H
p
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1111
11, . The first term of the right hand is this equation is positive. 
The sign is ambiguous because the second term is negative. However, an increase in 𝐾𝑡 the slope 
(1−𝛼)𝑝𝑡
𝛼+(1−𝛼)𝑝𝑡
 from zero 
to 1 − α. We find that X𝐾𝑡 − 𝜎 increase with 𝐾𝑡. Therefore, 
(1−𝛼)𝑝𝑡(𝑋𝐾𝑡− )
𝛼+(1−𝛼)𝑝𝑡
 increases with 𝐾𝑡 and the amount of 
increase raises with 𝐾𝑡. Consequently, 
 𝐾𝑡+1
 𝐾𝑡
>   and 
𝜕2𝐾𝑡+1
𝜕𝐾𝑡
2   . 
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